I believe in a concept I've come to call the unity of ethics. The core thesis is this: people frequently believe that there is a dichotomy between candidate ethical beliefs such that one has to be a consequentialist who evaluates ethics purely in terms of the ends to be achieved, or a deontologist, who evaluates ethics purely in terms of of the means used to achieve ends of any kind. To this dichotomy, one might reasonably rebut that a third option is to be a virtue ethicist who evaluates ethics purely in terms of inculcating virtue and inoculating against vice. I think a stronger rebuttal can be offered. I think any candidate ethical system begins with a purported fundamental truth, and that ends, means, virtues, and any other ethical quality will simply describe and apply that truth in a different way.
An example:
System: Buddhism
Purported Fundamental Truth: Unsatisfied desire leads to suffering. Suffering is inherently bad.
What end should humans strive for?: The elimination of desire
What means should humans use to act?: Meditation, ascetism, isolation, pacifism
What virtues should humans seek to embody?: Peacefulness, mindfulness, restraint
In each mode of analysis, the same fundamental truth is examined to yield different (but non-contradictory) conclusions. Similarly, if we examine a phenomena such as ocean waves in different scientific terms, we will view the same phenomena in different ways (say, the refraction of light versus the turbulence of the water versus the energy of the wave) which are non-contradictory. To fully understand a phenomenon, whether ethical or physical, we should seek to understand it from different (real, non-contradictory) perspectives. An ethical system which ignores modes of analysis is incomplete. One which denies the possibility of other modes of analysis is likely wrong. Consider another candidate belief system:
System: Utilitarianism
Purported Fundamental Truth: Happiness is good, and suffering is bad.
Ends: Maximization of utility (roughly speaking, happiness) as a sum across all entities
Means: Whatever achieves the ends
Virtues: Whatever achieves the ends
We can see that Utilitarianism does not seek to apply its fundamental truth beyond the scope of setting a goal to achieve. The system in my view only has one advantage, which is that the purported fundamental truth appears to be intuitively correct. I think it is actually wrong (more on that in the future). Note that there is relatively little to connect the precise ends advocated to the purported fundamental truth. The strongest argument of which I am aware proceeds from the goodness of happiness to argue that happiness experienced by an entity other than a given agent is also good, and that to be morally good one must therefore pursue that happiness. I think this commits a tremendous sleight of hand, in which the individual pursuit of happiness is transmuted into a social pursuit of happiness merely due to the fact that the word "happiness" is used in both cases. While an individual knows that he likes his own happiness, it is not clear why he should regard it as good that another is happy. To argue that "good" is inherently divorced from any particular agent would be to totally assume the conclusion from the start - one would still need a convincing account of why hedonism is wrong (prior to adoption of the utilitarian ethic).
Another example:
System: Objectivism
Purported Fundamental Truth: Every organism must act to survive
Ends: Individual survival (also self-actualization or achievement)
Means: Reason, logic
Virtues: Integrity, honesty, ability
I think it should be quite clear that each aspect of ethics reveals distinct and complementary insights into a candidate ethical system. I close with a rough sketch of my own system.
System: Genetic Ethics
Purported Fundamental Truth: Organisms are shaped by evolution to pursue reproduction (in a broad sense) above all else
Ends: Propagation of one's genes
Means: Reason, emotion, social affiliation
Virtues: Kin-supportiveness, kindness, courage, foresight
Wednesday, October 26, 2016
Sunday, April 24, 2016
The Centrality of Family
One particularly noteworthy test of intuition is the importance of family. Intuition that family has a positive ethical role seems to be widespread, but secular theories of morality tend to ignore or even weigh against the family.
The case for the family as a worthy institution is multiple. In part, it derives from historical social structures of evolving humans and pre-humans. A social structure which led to the development of modern humans ought to be given some extra consideration by those humans on the basis that it is likely to be necessary in some way for human success. In part, it is an economic argument that posits that keeping together those people who have a closely shared genetic interest will allow for greater cooperation and greater success. In part, it can be made on evidentiary grounds; there is now ample scientific evidence that the role of a nuclear family or an extended family is a positive one in the development of a child. As measured by later outcomes in life, a robust family environment with multiple adults closely related to the child and invested in the success of that child tends to lead to materially better outcomes. We should expect that family occupies not merely an ethical role of convenience (that it happens to sometimes be for the best) but that it has a central ethical role (it is usually for the best, to be overturned only by extreme or unusual circumstances).
The centrality of family will have a corollary impact on mate selection, a topic to which we will return.
How do other ethical theories fare on the topic of the family? In general, dismally. Religious moral theories tend to assign great weight to the family but without justification or integration into a larger framework of thought. Instead, the religious framework is typically a patchwork or constellation of ideas which are not fully integrated and each is not fully understood in light of the others. The fact that some of those ideas are brilliant and wonderful does little to navigate the student through the patchwork or constellation of disjoint ideas.
Secular theories fare even worse. Most are silent on the value of family, and regard it at best as a means to some utopian end. More frequently, strong attacks on the family can be launched under the guise of equality, justice, utility, or some other non-real value. By grounding family in its role as a mechanism for genetic propagation (a real, physical phenomenon) we shield it from many baseless and conjectural attacks.
An example: The Rawlsian theory of justice (widely accepted among the intellectual Left and the sire of modern pseudo-socialist political movements such as Social Justice) requires that all social goods (as if there were such a thing as a social good) be distributed (with no thought to their creation) equally among all members of society, except insofar as inequality helps those worst off. The last special exception, meant to inoculate the theory against extreme egalitarianism and therefore justified criticism of that failed branch if thought, is immediately discarded like a brown banana peel by those who seek to implement Rawls' theory. How might this theory apply to the family? What is parenting, if not a "social good"? What is a loving family environment, if not a "social good"? Accordingly, these things ought (under Rawls) be distributed equally, except insofar as their unequal distribution grants greater parenting to children who have none. Consequently, the Rawlsian imperative is to distribute children equally among parents (and vice versa). Rawls might demand a family who has 4 children give three up to three infertile couples, or that a family which has 6 children but an abundance of parental love should be forced to adopt another several orphans. Obviously both versions are monstrous. The Rawlsian theory fails to explain the importance of the family or to address is in a satisfactory way. The same can be said of the overwhelming majority of secular ethical theories.
Tuesday, April 19, 2016
The Argument from Intuition
Intuition is a tricky subject. It should be viewed not as a final authority on a philosophical concept, but as a useful barometer. It highlights areas where a concept divorces cultural norms or requires careful, reasoned consideration.
Nonetheless, intuition is powerful in philosophy. When a proposed moral theory achieves absurd results, that theory naturally (and in my opinion correctly) faces heightened scrutiny in that area.
We should expect that an ethical directive to pursue genetic self-interest will cohere with intuition better than almost any other candidate belief.
To the extent that intuition is biologically evolved, it will point in broad strokes to the same conclusion as a a self-interested pro-gene ethics. To the extent that intuition is culturally imparted, demographic dynamics should bias it towards genetic persistence. This is because the modal belief set is likely to be one consistent with memetic or genetic persistence, and in fact is likely consistent with both. A belief set which is inconsistent with persistence of these types is likely to die out, either in figurative memetic terms or in literal genetic ones.
On the other hand, theories which center around happiness, self-fulfillment or other supposed virtues will likely encounter difficulties in tests of intuitive appeal. They may capture important insights, but will continually conflict with human nature and human history.
Nonetheless, intuition is powerful in philosophy. When a proposed moral theory achieves absurd results, that theory naturally (and in my opinion correctly) faces heightened scrutiny in that area.
We should expect that an ethical directive to pursue genetic self-interest will cohere with intuition better than almost any other candidate belief.
To the extent that intuition is biologically evolved, it will point in broad strokes to the same conclusion as a a self-interested pro-gene ethics. To the extent that intuition is culturally imparted, demographic dynamics should bias it towards genetic persistence. This is because the modal belief set is likely to be one consistent with memetic or genetic persistence, and in fact is likely consistent with both. A belief set which is inconsistent with persistence of these types is likely to die out, either in figurative memetic terms or in literal genetic ones.
On the other hand, theories which center around happiness, self-fulfillment or other supposed virtues will likely encounter difficulties in tests of intuitive appeal. They may capture important insights, but will continually conflict with human nature and human history.
Monday, April 11, 2016
The Randian Argument
I will lay out here the Randian argument(s) in favor of my candidate ethical system: that morality consists of maximizing the number and duration of one's genes.
I call it the Randian argument because it closely parallels the arguments Ayn Rand gives for her individualist survivalist ethic. I consider it a logical and natural extension of Rand in light of a newer and better understanding of human nature. In this sense, it does not violate the Randian demand for always and only reason as a guide to thought.
The first formulation is this: Rand claims that all organisms face a fundamental choice of nature - to live or to die. Only by taking action can the organism live, and action taken to pursue some other goal is fruitless unless action is also taken to survive. Thus nature appoints as primary a particular value, survival. I believe the same can be said just as well of reproduction over a longer time frame and in the larger sense of reproduction. By this I mean the sense I am generally using - procreation but also helping others to survive and procreate; helping not only to create the next generation but to raise them and prepare them for the adult world. This fundamental choice version of the argument would give the resulting ethics a dualist tinge, blending the Randian survivalist ethos and my own. I consider this unsatisfactory, and am motivated by all of the other arguments I present for the procreation ethos to conclude: in the dualistic formulation, procreation trumps survival should the two conflict.
The second formulation is this: If all organisms act to survive, including simple bacteria, the same ought to apply to our own genes, which seem to have arisen historically as independent organisms and created animal bodies out of self-interest. Humans are the machines that human DNA builds to survive, and genes do so via our reproduction. The survivalist ethic applied to genes (i.e. applied to our current and improved understanding of human nature) is the procreation ethic.
The third formulation is this: There is a fundamental alternative not just between choosing to live versus choosing to die, but between choosing to have come into existence and not have come into existence. It is not an alternative that is available to us in fact, but it is an alternative which we can choose for the next generation. If morality is non-subjective we should expect that the moral choices of the next generation and the moral choices of the current generation differ only with respect to circumstances, not with respect to the individual actors. If we morally approve of our having come into existence (a premise very close to the heart of the Randian system, if not quite espoused by Ayn herself) we should in most circumstances conclude that the next generation would approve of itself coming into existence. Crucially, since we are aiming for a non-subjectivist ethics we must conclude that in most circumstances we morally approve of ourselves creating the next generation. The alternative is that ethics varies from person to person, not merely by circumstance but also in content - a conclusion we ought to reject on epistemological and metaphysical grounds. In Randian terms, if one's life is the standard of value, the processes that create life across time must also have positive moral value. In lay terms, the reader ought to say to themself: wouldn't it be bizarre if it were morally good for a thousand prior generations to procreate, ultimately resulting in my own existence, but I - who share a number of fundamental traits with them - have no moral inclination to create further generations?
I call it the Randian argument because it closely parallels the arguments Ayn Rand gives for her individualist survivalist ethic. I consider it a logical and natural extension of Rand in light of a newer and better understanding of human nature. In this sense, it does not violate the Randian demand for always and only reason as a guide to thought.
The first formulation is this: Rand claims that all organisms face a fundamental choice of nature - to live or to die. Only by taking action can the organism live, and action taken to pursue some other goal is fruitless unless action is also taken to survive. Thus nature appoints as primary a particular value, survival. I believe the same can be said just as well of reproduction over a longer time frame and in the larger sense of reproduction. By this I mean the sense I am generally using - procreation but also helping others to survive and procreate; helping not only to create the next generation but to raise them and prepare them for the adult world. This fundamental choice version of the argument would give the resulting ethics a dualist tinge, blending the Randian survivalist ethos and my own. I consider this unsatisfactory, and am motivated by all of the other arguments I present for the procreation ethos to conclude: in the dualistic formulation, procreation trumps survival should the two conflict.
The second formulation is this: If all organisms act to survive, including simple bacteria, the same ought to apply to our own genes, which seem to have arisen historically as independent organisms and created animal bodies out of self-interest. Humans are the machines that human DNA builds to survive, and genes do so via our reproduction. The survivalist ethic applied to genes (i.e. applied to our current and improved understanding of human nature) is the procreation ethic.
The third formulation is this: There is a fundamental alternative not just between choosing to live versus choosing to die, but between choosing to have come into existence and not have come into existence. It is not an alternative that is available to us in fact, but it is an alternative which we can choose for the next generation. If morality is non-subjective we should expect that the moral choices of the next generation and the moral choices of the current generation differ only with respect to circumstances, not with respect to the individual actors. If we morally approve of our having come into existence (a premise very close to the heart of the Randian system, if not quite espoused by Ayn herself) we should in most circumstances conclude that the next generation would approve of itself coming into existence. Crucially, since we are aiming for a non-subjectivist ethics we must conclude that in most circumstances we morally approve of ourselves creating the next generation. The alternative is that ethics varies from person to person, not merely by circumstance but also in content - a conclusion we ought to reject on epistemological and metaphysical grounds. In Randian terms, if one's life is the standard of value, the processes that create life across time must also have positive moral value. In lay terms, the reader ought to say to themself: wouldn't it be bizarre if it were morally good for a thousand prior generations to procreate, ultimately resulting in my own existence, but I - who share a number of fundamental traits with them - have no moral inclination to create further generations?
Thursday, April 7, 2016
The Teleological Argument
I present here the argument based on features of humans and of all living organisms. This is the most important and deepest argument in favor of my candidate ethical system: morality is the propagation of one's genes. As a result, I will likely need to revisit it and expand further in the future.
The teleological argument can be thought of as an argument about proper function. Simply put, if a human must do X, Y and Z to be considered to function properly then a human ought to do X Y and Z. The central problem of ethics is the is/ought dichotomy. This theory states that we may be able to describe the world as it is, but it does not follow that we can describe the world as it ought to be. The teleological argument, which concerns proper function, argues that there is something about the way humans are which requires a particular behavior to function properly and therefore that humans ought to exhibit that behavior. In this sense it is a direct attempt to defeat the is/ought dichotomy.
A designed object like a watch has a teleological nature. By virtue of the fact that a watch is a tool designed to tell time, it ought to do so within a certain range of accuracy. Similarly, biological organisms of all types and all complexities are designed, in the sense of emerging from dynamic, non-random systems. A bacterium is designed by its genes to form a protective cell wall, to seek nourishment, and to reproduce. If it fails to do any of these tasks, it will die and that individual bacterium will not pass on its genes. If the bacterium is functioning properly and in accordance with the genetic plan, it must act to accomplish these tasks. Larger organisms are not exempt from these facts. A salmon or mackerel that feels no reproductive urge is defective. It is not functioning properly, just as if it lacked a sense of sight or hunger. The same facts apply to dogs, cats, and of course Homo sapiens.
Human function is obviously much more complex than that of bacteria or even simple animals, but it cannot escape the facts of genetic evolution. A human being who is unconcerned with the spread of their genes is defective. That spread could take the form or bearing and raising children, but it can also take other forms such as helping relatives raise their children or even helping perfect strangers with areas that seem at first glance to have nothing to do with reproduction. More on this critical topic will follow. The term for a defect that we do not choose is disease, disability, or even simply defect as in birth defect. We rightly pity and sympathize with those who suffer from these defects through no fault of their own. The term for a defect chosen freely by the individual is evil.
The teleological argument can be thought of as an argument about proper function. Simply put, if a human must do X, Y and Z to be considered to function properly then a human ought to do X Y and Z. The central problem of ethics is the is/ought dichotomy. This theory states that we may be able to describe the world as it is, but it does not follow that we can describe the world as it ought to be. The teleological argument, which concerns proper function, argues that there is something about the way humans are which requires a particular behavior to function properly and therefore that humans ought to exhibit that behavior. In this sense it is a direct attempt to defeat the is/ought dichotomy.
A designed object like a watch has a teleological nature. By virtue of the fact that a watch is a tool designed to tell time, it ought to do so within a certain range of accuracy. Similarly, biological organisms of all types and all complexities are designed, in the sense of emerging from dynamic, non-random systems. A bacterium is designed by its genes to form a protective cell wall, to seek nourishment, and to reproduce. If it fails to do any of these tasks, it will die and that individual bacterium will not pass on its genes. If the bacterium is functioning properly and in accordance with the genetic plan, it must act to accomplish these tasks. Larger organisms are not exempt from these facts. A salmon or mackerel that feels no reproductive urge is defective. It is not functioning properly, just as if it lacked a sense of sight or hunger. The same facts apply to dogs, cats, and of course Homo sapiens.
Human function is obviously much more complex than that of bacteria or even simple animals, but it cannot escape the facts of genetic evolution. A human being who is unconcerned with the spread of their genes is defective. That spread could take the form or bearing and raising children, but it can also take other forms such as helping relatives raise their children or even helping perfect strangers with areas that seem at first glance to have nothing to do with reproduction. More on this critical topic will follow. The term for a defect that we do not choose is disease, disability, or even simply defect as in birth defect. We rightly pity and sympathize with those who suffer from these defects through no fault of their own. The term for a defect chosen freely by the individual is evil.
The Premise
The Premise of my argument and inquiry is this:
I do not intend to investigate deeply metaphysics or epistemology. I will assume a stable reality, independent of any particular observer, knowable through the senses, and discoverable through science.
In ethics, I will take on a candidate belief system based on genetic success and evolution as the determinants of morality. I will argue for this system and explore its potential implications. I will endeavor to extend the system to politics, the economy, and other fields of human action.
What is the nature of the ethical premise? It is not intended to be deontological, virtue-ethical, or impose fictitious "side constraints". It is a work of pure consequentialist theory, accepting the manipulations that such a theory is subject to and arguing that they are the best alternative.
My ethical premise is also not a "rule" consequentialist system, at least not on an a priori or assumptive basis. I will assume at the onset that the individual action which most closely produces an ethical result is morally correct, rather than the action which comports to some rule generally producing a desired result.
To state the ethical imperative succinctly: Among possible actions, that which most increases the duration and number of one's genes is the moral action.
I do not intend to investigate deeply metaphysics or epistemology. I will assume a stable reality, independent of any particular observer, knowable through the senses, and discoverable through science.
In ethics, I will take on a candidate belief system based on genetic success and evolution as the determinants of morality. I will argue for this system and explore its potential implications. I will endeavor to extend the system to politics, the economy, and other fields of human action.
What is the nature of the ethical premise? It is not intended to be deontological, virtue-ethical, or impose fictitious "side constraints". It is a work of pure consequentialist theory, accepting the manipulations that such a theory is subject to and arguing that they are the best alternative.
My ethical premise is also not a "rule" consequentialist system, at least not on an a priori or assumptive basis. I will assume at the onset that the individual action which most closely produces an ethical result is morally correct, rather than the action which comports to some rule generally producing a desired result.
To state the ethical imperative succinctly: Among possible actions, that which most increases the duration and number of one's genes is the moral action.
Wednesday, April 6, 2016
Statement of Purpose
This work is a collection of essays. It intends to capture a single line of thinking: what if evolution is ethics? In other words, what if human beings' moral nature relates primarily to evolution rather than to reason, happiness, self-fulfillment, or any other supposed virtue? What value system, what politics, what theory of mind and of happiness will ultimately flow from that simple inquiry?
I must confess that at time of writing I do not yet know. I hope that in reading, thinking, and discussion you will join me in discovery.
-Jupiter
I must confess that at time of writing I do not yet know. I hope that in reading, thinking, and discussion you will join me in discovery.
-Jupiter
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)