No Natural Rights

Let's be upfront. My theory, being a purely consequentialist theory, does not believe in individual or natural rights as a foundational assumption. They may well be a consequence we happily find along the way, but at the outset we must bid farewell to them.

This is in fact the chief reason that this blog is anonymous. I cannot yet state with confidence that I will not arrive at some horrible set of conclusions (and be sent scrambling to find an error in my reasoning).

One avenue I want to explore is whether natural rights can be resurrected as a consequence of my genetic view. Humans all share a basic humanity and capacity to interbreed - perhaps this is enough that the individual who is properly (as opposed to mistakenly) pursuing their own genetic interest act as if there are universal rights, and the formulation of rights serves a summary (i.e. conceptual) function. The right to be free rather than enslaved would thus be a statement of a universal prohibition (i.e. enslaving others is always anti-genetic, despite appearances) rather than a statement of a universal good.

Edit: Upon further reconsideration, I think "purely consequentialist" is the wrong way to explain the way in which I disclaim natural rights. I think a better way to put it would be more simply: I do not start with them as an assumption.

The Syllogistic Form

It will soon be time to focus on the implications of my central premise. Before moving on, I would like to lay the core argument out as cleanly and briefly as possible. I believe that it can be framed as a logical deduction, leaving no viable alternative to my premise.

The argument:

• All evolved organisms, as well as their organ systems and subsystems, are tailored to propagate genes
• When an organism, organ system, or subsystem functions to propagate genes, it is functioning properly
• When an organism, organ system, or subsystem does not function to propagate genes, it is functioning improperly (it is disordered or diseased)
• Human beings are the product of evolution in the same sense as the first point
• Human moral faculties are subject to evolutionary pressures in the same sense as the first point
• Therefore, human moral faculties which promote genetic propagation are functioning correctly, and human moral faculties which suppress genetic propagation are functioning incorrectly